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Abstract
Minimum capital requirement regulation forces banks to refund a substantial amount
of their investments with equity. This creates a buffer against losses, but also in-
creases the cost of funding. If higher refunding costs translate into higher loan
interest rates, then borrowers are likely to become more risky, which may destabilize
the lending bank. This paper argues that, in addition to the buffer and cost effect
of capital regulation, there is a strategic effect. A binding capital requirement regu-
lation restricts the lending capacity of banks, and therefore reduces the intensity of
loan interest rate competition and increases the banks’ price setting power as shown
in Schliephake and Kirstein (2013). This paper discusses the impact of this indirect
effect from capital regulation on the stability of the banking sector. It is shown that
the enhanced price setting power can reverse the net effect that capital requirements
have under perfect competition.
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1. Introduction
This paper analyses the effect of capital requirement regulation on the stability of
banks in a loan market where few oligopolistic banks compete in loan interest rates
and decide on optimal loan capacities by their refunding structure.
Because bank loans are likely to be homogenous, the unregulated loan interest
rate competition is fierce, and banks undercut each other in loan rates until the
interest payments equal the marginal refunding cost of the asset investment - the
classical Bertrand result.
However, regulating the capital structure also changes the competitive behavior
of the banks, i.e., the timing of strategic decisions. Due to higher costs, banks may
prefer to adapt lending rather than the capital structure when they are confronted
with a binding capital requirement. In this case the introduction of a capital require-
ment regulation can change Bertrand competition into a two stage game. In the first
stage banks choose optimal loan capacities, and then, in the second stage, the banks
choose loan interest rates to clear capacities. This idea that capital regulation creates
a credible precommitment to loan interest rates, and thereby reduces the intensity
of interest rate competition, was first discussed in Schliephake and Kirstein (2013).1
They develop a detailed analysis of the conditions under which capital requirement
regulation changes the strategic interaction among oligopolistic banks from strategic
complementarity in price setting to strategic substitutes in capacity choices. They
show that higher capital requirements reduce the incentives of banks to undercut in
1For technical reasons Schliephake and Kirstein (2013) assume that borrowers have preferences
for a specific banks. This assumption allows the transformation from indirect to direct demand
without the explicit definition of a certain rationing rule. However, they show that their results
also hold when borrowers become close to indifference between loans such that loans are perfect
substitutes.
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interest rates but their model neglects any uncertainty and risk effects.
In contrast, this paper focuses on the impact of increased price setting power on
the stability of the banking sector. In this paper I will call the effect of enhanced
price setting power “Cournotization” effect. It creates an indirect effect of capital
requirement regulation on the stability of the banking sector. In particular, it influ-
ences the ability of banks to consider the risk shifting behavior of their borrowers,
and thus the effect changes the optimal reaction of banks when they face increased
capital requirements. This effect adds to various direct and indirect effects of capital
requirement regulation and competition on the stability of the banking system that
are discussed in the literature overview and summarized in Figure 1 and Table 1.
This paper shows that the cost of recapitalization and the resulting Cournotiza-
tion effect may play a role in determining the net effect of capital requirement on
banking stability. In particular, the results indicate that the number of oligopolistic
competitors, the correlation of loan defaults, and the intensity of borrower risk shift-
ing simultaneously determine whether capital requirement regulation of oligopolistic
bank markets enhances or erodes the stability of the sector.
In order to analyze the effect of Cournotization on bank stability, it is necessary
to establish the "missing link" between the literature on competition and stability on
one hand, and the literature on capital regulation and stability, on the other hand.
This is done in section 2. In section 3, the basic model of oligopolistic loan interest
rate competition and capital regulation is set up. A simplified version of the model
in Schliephake and Kirstein (2013) is introduced and the results derived to illustrate
the Cournotization effect. In section 4, the effect of the increased price setting
power on the optimal decisions and resulting effects on stability are analyzed under
perfect correlation. In section 5, the results are generalized for imperfectly correlated
borrower defaults. Section 6 discusses the policy implications and concludes.
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2. Literature Review
The literature on competition and stability and the literature on capital regulation
and stability respectively is extensive. However, only few theoretical papers exist that
analyze the simultaneous effects. Figure 1 provides an overview of the main effects
that capital regulation and competition have on the stability of banks. The term
banking stability thereby means the probability of an individual bank to default. In
particular, consider a bank that invests its equity and deposits in risky loans. The
term stability then reflects the probability that the return of non-defaulting loan
assets is greater or equal the bank’s liabilities to its depositors. A lower probability
of an individual bank default thereby reflects higher banking stability.2
The literature on the relationship between competition and stability can be
roughly divided in two streams. Representatives of the competition-instability hy-
pothesis argue that more competition erodes stability because it reduces the charter
value of the bank and, therefore, increases the incentives to take more risk. This
charter value effect is the effect numbered (I) in Figure 1 and has been discussed, for
example, by Matutes and Vives (2000), Hellmann et al. (2000), Repullo (2004) and
Allen and Gale (2000). Moreover, Allen and Gale (2004) argue that a reduction in
the charter value of banks also decreases incentives to spend effort on monitoring,
thereby further increasing the riskiness of the bank. In general, the models on the
stability enhancing charter value effect of competition focus on competition on the
liability side of the bank and take the investment risk of banks as exogenous. In other
words the charter value effect argues that if banks fully control their riskiness, they
2This idiosyncratic definition of banking stability does not reflect systemic risk. An analysis of
the impact of competition on the systemic risk of the banking sector is beyond the scope of this
paper and left for future research.
4
Figure 1: The Effects of Capital Regulation and Competition on Banking Stability
The charter value effect (I) enhances stability by reducing the deposit rates to be paid
on liabilities. The risk shifting effect (II) reflects the aggregate probability of asset
default that is influenced by the loan interest rate. The margin effect (III) occurs
when defaults are imperfectly correlated (ρ < 1) and enhances stability through
higher returns on non-defaulting assets. The buffer effect (IV) reflects lower liabilities
to depositors if assets are financed with more equity. Higher equity funding increases
the marginal cost (V) and thereby the loan interest rate, which reinforces borrower
risk shifting. The Cournotization effect (VI) may introduce price setting power of
banks if recapitalization is sufficiently costly and, therefore, influences the bank’s
reavtion to higher regulation.
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have more incentives to decrease their risk of default the more profits they expect to
make in future. If higher regulation constraints the ability of banks to invest in as-
sets, banks demand less deposits resulting in lower deposit rates and higher marginal
profits. Since this effect is straightforward and unambiguous, it will be neglected in
the below analysis.
Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) challenge the charter value hypothesis by allowing not
only banks but also borrowers to control the riskiness of the bank and its investments.
In their model they consider the competition for loan assets and allow borrowers to
react to higher loan interest rates. Building on the seminal work of Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981), they argue that it is not only the limited liability of banks, which
gives rise to risk shifting, but also that the risk of loan assets increases in the loan
interest rate. Assuming perfect correlation of loan defaults, this extension actually
the “conventional wisdom” that higher competition leading to instability. If risk
shifting takes place in the loan asset market, increased competition can actually
reduce the probability of bank failure, since lower loan rates reduce loan asset risk.
This borrower risk shifting effect is labeled effect (II) in Figure 1.
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) extend the Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) model
and allow for imperfect correlation among the investment projects. They argue, that
higher loan interest rates from lower competition increase borrower risk shifting on
the one hand but also increase the margin on non-defaulting loans, labeled effect (III).
The higher margins on non-defaulting loans can outweigh the borrower risk shifting.
The relative strength of the margin effect thereby depends on the correlation of
defaults in the bank’s asset portfolio. Their findings indicate that if all loans do
not default at the same time then the impact of competition on banking stability is
generally non-monotonous.
Similar to the theoretical predictions of the literature on the impact of compe-
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tition on stability, the literature on the net effect of minimum capital regulation
on stability is contradictory, as well. Higher equity funding of investment, ceteris
paribus, increases the stability of banks, since equity provides a buffer against un-
expected losses and reduces the moral hazard of banks similar to the charter value
effect of low competition. In other words, forcing banks to refund a fixed amount
of assets with higher equity decreases leverage and makes banks more stable, which
is labeled effect (IV). If banks internalize all costs and benefits of bank equity, the
private optimal capital structure would coincide with the socially optimal capital
structure as discussed by Gale (2003). However, banks do not fully internalize the
benefits of equity since they are shielded at least partly against the downside risk of
their investments by the banking safety net. Setting minimum capital requirements
is a regulatory instrument that shifts the risks borne by the depositors, or insured by
the safety net, back to the shareholders. Hence, moral hazard and the incentive of
excessive risk taking is reduced as shown by Hellmann et al. (2000), Repullo (2004),
and Allen et al. (2011). Furthermore, higher capital requirements reduce the risk of
contagion among banks as pointed out by Allen and Carletti (2011).
However, regulating the refunding structure of banks also changes their opti-
mal investment decisions. Generally, when equity funding is costly to the bank,
an increase in capital requirement regulation has multiple effects that stabilize and
destabilize the banking sector.
Firstly, higher equity funding decreases the amount of deposit funding and, there-
fore, reduces the states of nature in which a bank can fail, which is the above discussed
buffer effect (IV).
Secondly, it increases the marginal cost of financing investments. The higher cost
of funding decreases the banks profitability, which decreases the banks charter value,
and thereby gives rise to higher risk taking, which destabilizes the bank. At the same
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time, the higher cost of funding decreases the activity of the banks. Less activity
means less lending, which results in increased loan interest rates. Higher loan interest
rates lead to higher earnings on non-defaulting loans, which can offset losses from
defaulting loans (II), on the one hand. On the other hand, higher loan rates reduce
the earnings of borrowers, which induces risk shifting of borrowers (III). The net
effect of capital requirement regulation on banking stability depends on which of the
described effects prevails.
Empirical evidence on the relationship of capital requirements, competition, and
financial stability is equally ambiguous. Carletti and Hartmann (2003) provide a
good overview of the mixed empirical findings on the relationship between compe-
tition and stability. Keeley (1990) finds that the erosion in the US banks’ market
power, which resulted from deregulation, caused an increase in the bank failure
rates during the 1980’s. Similarly, Beck et al. (2006) provide evidence that more
concentrated banking systems are less vulnerable to systemic risk because more con-
centrated banks tend to diversify their risks more. Schaeck et al. (2009) also come
to the result that a more concentrated banking system is less fragile to systemic
risk. In contrast, Berger et al. (2009) find that, though more competitive banking
systems tend to take more risk, they also compensate the higher risk with higher
equity to asset ratios and are, thus, less fragile to systemic risk. Schaeck and Cihak
(2011) find empirical evidence that a bank’s capital structure is one of the chan-
nels through which competition may have an impact on the stability of the banking
sector. However, there is little empirical evidence that suggests that more stringent
capital regulation actually improves the stability of a particular banking sector as
pointed out by Barth et al. (2005).
Building on the rather mixed theoretical prediction and empirical evidence, re-
cent empirical work focuses on the role that the market and institutional environment
8
plays in the determination of the relationship between competition and the stabil-
ity of the banking sector. Beck et al. (2011) seize the theoretical suggestions on
non-monotone relationships among competition and stability, and try to identify the
most prominent factors that determine the amplitude and direction of the relation-
ship. Based on cross-country data, they find that the relation between competition
and stability is likely to be negative the stricter the capital regulation is, the more
restricted banking activities are, and the more homogenous the banking sector is as
a whole. In particular, they find that more binding capital regulation tends to have
an amplifying effect on the competition-stability relationship, regardless of the sign
of the particular relationship.
To the author’s knowledge, only two theoretical papers exist that try to simul-
taneously analyze the effect that competition and capital regulation have on bank
stability: Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) show that the ambiguous effect of competi-
tion on banks’ risk taking translates into ambiguous effects of capital requirement on
the stability of the banking sector. Though their model tries to capture the influence
of correlation among loan defaults, the simplification they use in their model still
implies that either all loans default at the same time or no defaults occur. Banks
themselves can only influence the probability with which these defaults occur. Hence,
there is no positive marginal effect of higher profits from non-defaulting loans, which
could buffer losses from defaulting loans.
Martinez-Miera (2009) analyzes the impact of capital requirement regulation on
the probability of bank failure under different exogenous market structures when
loan defaults are imperfectly correlated. He argues that if the asset risk of the
bank’s loan portfolio is not perfectly correlated, capital requirements have ambiguous
effects on the stability of a bank, which is labeled effect (V). He shows that in
highly concentrated loan markets the increase in price setting power resulting from
9
Table 1: Overview of the Main Literature and the Discussed Effects
 Literature Low Competition: High Competition: Assumptions Basic Effects 
N
o 
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n 
Among others:  
Matutes and Vives (2000),  
Hellmann et al. (2000),  
Allen and Gale (2000) 
Stabilizes Banking Destabilizes Banking Exogenous Competition for Deposits, Bank Risk Shifting Charter Value (I) 
Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) Destabilizes Banking Stabilizes Banking 
Exogenous Competition for 
Loan Assets, Borrower Risk 
Shifting 
Risk Shifting (II) 
Martinez-Miera 
and Repullo 
(2010) 
Perfect 
Correlation Destabilizes Banking Stabilizes Banking Exogenous Competition for Loan Assets, Borrower Risk 
Shifting, Imperfect 
Correlation 
Risk Shifting (II), 
Margin (III), 
Buffer (IV) Imperfect 
Correlation 
U-shaped Relationship:  
Competition-Instability 
C
ap
ita
l R
eg
ul
at
io
n 
Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) 
Regulation Destabilizes 
if Competition 
Stabilizes 
Regulation Stabilizes 
if Competition 
Destabilizes 
Exogenous Competition for 
Deposits and Assets, Bank 
controls „correlation“ 
(probability of perfectly 
correlated Default) 
Risk Shifting (II) 
Martinez-Miera (2009) Net Effect of Capital Requirement Depends on Exogenous Competition and Correlation 
Exogenous Competition for 
Loan Assets, Borrower Risk 
Shifting, Imperfect 
Correlation 
Risk Shifting (II), 
Margin (III), 
Buffer (IV) 
This Paper 
Net Effect of Capital Requirement Depends on 
Cost of Recapitalization, Bank Concentration, 
and Correlation 
Endogenous Competition, 
Schliephake and Kirstein 
(2013) 
Risk Shifting (II), 
Margin (III), 
Buffer (IV), 
Cournotization (VI) 
higher capital requirements can reestablish the stability enhancing effect of capital
requirements even with borrower risk shifting, provided that the risk shifting effect is
strong enough. The intuition is that a monopolist who anticipates the risk shifting of
borrowers may find it profitable to internalize the increased marginal costs of higher
capital requirement regulation.
In contrast to Martinez-Miera (2009), this paper does not take the competitive
environment as given but explicitly considers changes in the competitive structure
due to the strategic reaction of banks on the regulation. The Cournotization effect
(VI) of capital requirement regulation reduces the incentives to undercut competitors
in loan interest rates. This leads to increased price setting power, which again rein-
forces the two effects of increased loan interest rates: the margin effect (III), if loan
defaults are not perfectly correlated, and the risk shifting effect (II) by borrowers.
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This paper shows that the net effect of fiercer regulation on banking stability
depends on how much market power is gained by the Cournotization effect. In-
tuitively, the increase in price setting power is higher, the more concentrated the
market structure is, i.e., the less banks compete for loans.
Using a model framework adapted from Martinez-Miera (2009) the analysis sug-
gests that in an economy, where a monopolist finds it optimal to internalize the
increased marginal cost of capital regulation, there exists a critical market concen-
tration for which the Cournot oligopolists internalize the increased costs. In this case
the cost of default decreases due to lower liabilities to depositors, as well as the prob-
ability of default shrinks, because the banks anticipate profit reducing risk shifting
behavior of their customers. The paper therefore extends the analysis of Martinez-
Miera (2009) for endogenous competition and adds an important policy implication:
a regulator that wants to foster bank stability does not only have to consider the
number of competitors but also the cost of recapitalization in the banking sector.
The main finding of this paper is that if low competition has a stability enhancing
effect, higher capital regulation should not be accompanied by a support of recapi-
talization of banks. A summary of the main literature, their crucial assumptions and
differences in results is provided in Table 1.
The next section introduces the basic model assumptions and presents a simplified
and generalized version of the Cournotization effect as discussed in Schliephake and
Kirstein (2013).
3. The Model Setup
Consider a single-period model of n banking firms.The banks compete for risky
loans L in loan interest rates r. Loans default with probability p in which case
the bank receives nothing. In case of success, i.e., with probability 1 − p the bank
11
receives the contracted repayment from the borrower. In the basic setting, I assume
that loan defaults are perfectly correlated such that all projects default at the same
time. In the beginning of the period, each bank has access to deposit finance (D)
at a constant cost (rD ≥ 0). The deposits are insured at a flat insurance premium,
normalized to zero without loss of generality.3 Therefore, the supply of deposits to
a bank is independent of the riskiness of the bank’s asset investment.
Each bank is run by a bank owner manager, who can acquire equity ki from
shareholders, which have an alternative and equally risky investment opportunity
with return rK = rD + c. This fixed opportunity cost reflects the higher cost of
equity compared to the insured deposit funding.
The assumption that equity funding is costly is not undisputed in the literature.
In particular, Admati et al. (2010) elaborate the weaknesses of the assumption that
bank equity funding is costly to society. However, in this simple model, the cost of
equity is not seen from a welfare perspective, but it is rather assumed that equity
funding is relatively more costly to the specific bank than deposit funding. This is a
direct consequence of the deposit insurance system. The insured depositors do not
expect a risk premium, while the liable equity investors do. Another interpretation
is that higher opportunity cost compared to deposit funding reflects the additional
benefits that deposits create to the depositors. The role of the bank as a financial
intermediary is, therefore, welfare enhancing. Unnecessarily high capital requirement
regulation would erode the bank’s role as a financial intermediary offering depositing
services, i.e. a equity to asset ratio of 1 would not allow for financial intermediation
in the sense of providing deposit services. Hence, equity is assumed to be costly to
3In alliance with the current regulatory system, this paper takes the existence of the fixed-rate
deposit insurance as given, whereas the insurance can be explicit by an ex ante financed deposit
insurance or implicit by a guaranteed ex-post bail out policy.
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the bank, and pure equity funding in our simple model setup would be inefficient in
the absence of bank Moral Hazard.
A minimum capital requirement is defined as the requirement to refund a specific
proportion of assets (of a specific risk type) with equity βli ≤ ki. In line with the
theoretical and empirical findings, it is assumed that bank managers rather avoid
increasing equity, but adapt their asset portfolios when facing a regulatory equity
shortage.4 The assumption that there are prohibitive costs of recapitalizing im-
mediately changes the sequence of decisions made, and influences the competitive
environment. The Bertrand competition among banks becomes a two stage decision
making process, where in the first stage, the bank has to define the capital structure,
and in the second stage, competition in loan interest rates takes place.
t=1 According to minimum capital requirement regulation, banks choose optimal
ki , i = 1...n, i = j with K =
∑n
i ki.
t=2 After observing the opponents k−i, bank i chooses optimal ri(r−i, K)
For simplicity, I assume that equity can only be raised in t = 1, i.e., the cost of
immediate recapitalization is prohibitively high.5 The capital decision is sunk in stage
2. Hence, the marginal cost of equity in stage two is zero. Instead of influencing the
4Anecdotal evidence that equity constrained banks adapt assets rather than liabilities could be
found during the recent financial crisis, where many banks faced difficulties in replacing lost equity
in a timely fashion. Calomiris and Herring (2012) discuss that despite banks being undercapitalized
as a result of the need to write off asset losses in 2008, the financial institutions preferred to wait
instead of immediately raising new equity. They argue that stock prices were so low that the
issuance of significant amounts of equity, in order to cover the large losses incurred, “would have
implied substantial dilution of stockholders – including existing management.” These observations
suggest that bank managers try to avoid an immediate increase in equity in order to satisfy market
demand, and prefer to reduce the demand for loans by increasing the loan rate.
5Schliephake and Kirstein (2013) allow for recapitalization in stage two and show that if recap-
italization is costly enough, the equity raised in the first stage becomes a binding constraint in the
second stage.
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marginal cost of investing in loan assets in the second stage, the regulatory minimum
capital requirement sets an upper bound on the individual bank’s ability to supply
loans li:
li(ri(r−i), r−i) ≤ ki
β
(1)
Let r (·) be the inverse demand function that is decreasing and concave in the loan
quantities supplied, i.e., r(0) > rD, r′(·) < 0 and r′′(·) ≤ 0. The optimal prices
chosen in the second stage, therefore, depend on the amount of equity raised by each
bank in the first stage. Therefore, the capacity constraint for loan supply puts a
lower bound to equilibrium loan interest rates:
ri(r−i, K) ≥ rmin
(
ki
β
)
(2)
For given amount of equity, it would never be profitable to undercut rmin, because
this would imply a demand above the capacity, i.e. a demand that cannot be served
due to the regulatory restrictions; implying lower profits.
3.1. The Optimal Second Stage Behavior
Consider first the trivial case where all banks have raised sufficient equity to
serve the loan market demand at the Bertrand price with externalized downside risk.
Formally, this means that the aggregate equity on the balance sheet of all banks
exceeds
K > βL(rD). (3)
The second stage pricing decision would be the same as in the unregulated case. The
fierce price competition is not constrained by the first stage capital decision. Because
the equity decision is sunk at the second stage, the marginal cost equal the deposit
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funding cost and the non-profit condition would be:
r = rD. (4)
Consider now the case where the raised amount of equity is “sufficiently small”.
The first stage amount of equity is sufficiently small if, firstly, the capacity to provide
loans to borrowers from the first stage capital decision bindingly constrains the price
competition K < βL(rD). Secondly, sufficiently small assumes that the capacities are
so low that, under any rationing rule, the remaining demand whenever ri < rmin−i , is
below the monopoly loan output βlMi (K) > ki for i, j, where lMi (K) is the monopoly
loan amount in the residual market.
Lemma 1. (From Tirole (1988)) For “sufficiently small” capacities to lend that are
set in the first stage, the second stage loan rate competition yields a unique Nash
Equilibrium that is independent of any rationing rule, namely a loan interest rate
that just clears capacities: r
(
K
β
)
Proof. If the infimum of the loan interest rates set by the competitors equals the
capacity clearing interest rate, undercutting the opponent’s price can never be prof-
itable. Consider contrariwise the case where ri < r(K). Since recapitalization is
assumed not to be possible in stage two, price undercutting would only lead to ex-
cess demand for loans, which cannot be served due to the binding minimum capital
requirement. Undercutting in loan rates is not profitable, because each bank lends
already the maximum capacity to its borrowers.
Furthermore, a price increase is not profitable, since profits are assumed to be
strictly convex in loan quantities and the capacity is assumed to be smaller than
the residual demand monopoly quantity. For any r(K) < ri, bank i receives the
residual demand, after the m other banks served the loan applicants up to their own
capacity. The assumption lMi (K) >
ki
β
implies by definition Π(lMi ) > Π(
kj
β
). The
inverse demand function implies r(LMj (ki, kj)) < r
(
Kj
β
)
. Since the resulting profit
maximizing loan quantity in the residual market is higher than the small capacity, the
respective profit maximizing loan rate must be lower than the constrained optimal
loan rate that clears capacity. Hence, overbidding can never be profitable. Figure 2
illustrates this point.
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Figure 2: The Overbidding at Competitor’s Profit with Sufficiently Low Capacities
.
The underlying assumption that capacities are chosen to be sufficiently small in
the first stage seems to be quite restrictive. One sufficient condition for the choice
of low capacities would be very high cost of equity. However, the seminal work of
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) shows that, for a concave inverse demand function,
and efficient rationing of the residual demand, installing sufficiently low capacities
is the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium of the two stage game, regardless of the
investment cost of capacity, which is the private cost of equity in this model.6 Since
this model focuses on the effects of a change in the competitive structure induced by
capital requirement regulation on the riskiness of banks, it is assumed for simplicity
that borrowers are rationed according to the efficient rationing rule, and accordingly
6Davidson and Deneckere (1986) show that this result is not robust against different rationing
rules. With alternative rationing rules, competitors find it optimal to build up capacities that are
not sufficiently low, but below the demand for selling the product at marginal cost. For capacities
that are not sufficiently small, sub-game perfect strategies only exist in mixed strategies. However,
regardless of the specific rationing rule, the separation of decisions into capacity buildup and price
competition leads to reduced incentives to undercut in prices and, therefore, positive profits.
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that the result of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) can be applied.
3.2. The Optimal First Stage Capacity Choice
Anticipating that it is the optimal behavior in the second stage to clear any ca-
pacity, banks choose the individual amount of equity in the first stage that maximizes
the first stage objective function:
k∗i = argmax
(
ki
β
·
[
(1− p) ·
(
r
(
K
β
)
− rD(1− β)
)
− rKβ
])
(5)
This is the classical Cournot competition objective function, where rK -the cost of
equity - can be interpreted as the marginal cost of investing into loan capacity. A
symmetric equilibrium then consists of a vector ki which simultaneously satisfy the
system of first order conditions for all banks i = 1...n.
For symmetric banks, which have identical characteristics and face the identical
demand and cost functions, the Cournot equilibrium is symmetric.7 In such a sym-
metric equilibrium it must hold that ki = kj = k. Therefore, it must also hold that
K =
∑
ki = nk. The first order condition for a symmetric Cournot equilibrium can
thus be simplified to:
r′(K) · K
n
+
(
(r(K)− (1− β)rD − βrK
(1− p)
)
= 0 (6)
The first term reflects “market power rents” that result from the strategic com-
mitment to Cournot capacities in the first stage. The term captures the effect of
a decreasing demand that is taken into consideration when capacities are built up
in the first stage. The second term reflects each bank’s expected payoff per unit of
loans.
7See Tirole (1988), pp. 220 for a discussion of symmetry, existence and uniqueness of a Cournot
equilibrium.
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The Cournotization effect then describes a situation where, because of sufficiently
high recapitalization costs, the actual Bertrand competition for loans is constrained
by a strategic loan capacity choice. Therefore, the Bertrand competition for loans can
be described by Cournot competition. If the recapitalization costs are low, such that
the capacity constraint is not binding, the existing Bertrand competition can still be
described in the quantity space by Cournot competition with an infinite number of
competitors.
Lemma 2. If there is no Cournotization effect, because recapitalization costs are
low, the unconstrained Bertrand competition can be described in the quantity space
by the Cournot equilibrium with an infinite number of competitors.
Proof. If the number of competitors approaches infinity, then the market power term
vanishes and the sub-game perfect outcome approaches the one stage Bertrand equi-
librium outcome
lim
n→∞
(
r(K) = (1− β)rD + βrK
(1− p)
)
. (7)
When discussing the impact of the Cournotization effect on stability of banks, I
will therefore compare the situation where n → ∞ with a situation where n < ∞.
This also implies that a low number of banks in the oligopolistic market leads to
a relatively high increase of price setting power in the two stage game, compared
to unconstrained Bertrand competition. Therefore, a high market concentration is
likely to be reflected in a capacity constrained loan market competition with higher
marginal profits compared to the Bertrand equilibrium.
Because in equilibrium the capital requirement will be binding, I can substitute
ki
β
= li such that each bank chooses its individual optimal loan amount. The capacity
constrained objective function then reflects the Cournot decision problem in loan
18
quantities.8
l∗i = argmax (li [(1− p)(r (L)− rD(1− β))− rKβ]) (8)
Denoting h(L) := (1−p)(r (L)−rD(1−β)) as the extended indirect demand function
I can write the first order condition as the general Cournot equilibrium condition:
h′(L) · L
n
+ (h(L)− rKβ) = 0. Analogous to equation (6) the first term reflects the
gained market power, which approaches zero in the unconstrained Bertrand competi-
tion, i.e., if recapitalization is costless. Lemma 2 implies that such an unconstrained
competition can be described in the quantity space as hypothetical increase of n to
infinity.
In the following section, I will discuss how the increase of capital requirement
regulation β influences this equilibrium condition and the according default risk of a
bank, given there is a Cournotization effect. Moreover, I will compare the results to
the net effects in Bertrand competition and will discuss if a regulator should control
for the Cournotization effect or not.
4. Constrained Competition with Risk Shifting and Perfect Correlation
The previous discussion concentrated on the changes in competitive behavior
of banks when capital requirement regulation is tightened, while the risk taking
behavior of borrowers was assumed to be exogenous. However, not only banks,
but also borrowers are limitedly liable, and thus protected against the downside
risk of investments. Higher loan interest rates reduce the profitability of borrowers
investment projects, which gives incentives to search for higher yields at the cost
8Keeping equity as the decision variable does not change the qualitative results but unnecessarily
complicates the notation in the following, because the capital requirement rate beta influences not
only the marginal equity cost but also acts as a scaling factor for the equity decision. However, this
function as a scaling factor has no impact on the risk choice of the bank and is, therefore, neglected
in the following.
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of a higher risk of the project. The model is, therefore, extended to the optimal
responses of borrowers’ to differing loan rates resulting from the tightening of capital
requirement regulation.
The intuition is that the individual default probabilities of projects is partly
controlled by the borrowers decision to control for risk. This could either reflect a
certain costly effort that borrowers spend to enhance the success of their projects, or
by the unobservable choice of the particular project the borrower invests in. The less
profitable projects become that are financed by bank loans, the less effort borrowers
are willing to spend, and the lower are the success rates of their projects. To model
the borrower risk shifting I follow the model set up of Martinez-Miera and Repullo
(2010).
A continuum of penniless entrepreneurs captured with i, who have access to risky
projects of fixed size, normalized to 1. The entrepreneurs can spend effort on an indi-
vidual alternative (e.g. employment) to obtain a utility level b[0, B]. The reservation
utility is continuously distributed on [0, B] with the cumulative distribution function
G(b). Let G(u) denote the measure of entrepreneurs that can obtain an alternative
utility less than or equal to u.
In case of success, projects yield a risky return α(pj) and zero otherwise. The
component pi is the endogenously chosen probability of default, and reflects the
costly effort an entrepreneur spends on the project to enhance expected output.9
9Boyd et al. (2009) explicitly model the optimal effort choice of entrepreneurs. The projects
yield an output of y˜+ z. The total return component y is random and distributed with the density
function f(y) and the cumulative density F (y) on the closed interval [0, A], which is known by the
bank and the borrowers. The component z is endogenous and reflects the costly effort the borrower
is willing to spend on the project to enhance output. The effort cost is c(z) a strictly increasing,
twice differentiable, convex cost function. For a given contracted loan rate, a borrower defaults
whenever y ≤ y ≡ r− z. Knowing the loan rate offered, the entrepreneur chooses his optimal effort
in order to maximize his expected profit: max
z
´ A
y
(y + z − r)f(y)dy − c(z). Integrating by parts
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As in Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), I assume that α(0) < α′(0) in order to
get interior solutions. The bank offers a standard debt contract with limited liability
of borrowers: In case of project success with probability (1 − pi), the bank receives
the contracted loan interest r, and in case of default with probability pi, the bank
receives nothing, since the project’s liquidation value is assumed to be zero.
Lemma 3. Because of the limited liability of a standard debt contract the default
risk of a single loan increases in the equilibrium loan interest rate dp
dr
> 0.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix A.
It is further assumed that entrepreneurs are homogenous in their objective func-
tion, except for the exogenous reservation utilities uj. Hence, all entrepreneurs will
choose the identical optimal default probability pj(r(L)) = p(r(L)), {j | uj ≤ u(r)}
or opt for their outside option and do not borrow from banks. A bank that is lending
to Li(r) borrowers, faces individual loan defaults of p(r(L)) in the portfolio.
If all projects are perfectly correlated, i.e., ρ = 1, and thus default at the same
time, the bank’s portfolio risk of default is also equal to p(r(L)). Under perfect
correlation, there is no margin effect, because all projects either default or not.
Similarly, there is no buffer effect for a leveraged bank. A lower leverage allows the
bank to absorb a higher share of defaults in the portfolio. However, with perfect
correlation the share of defaults is either zero or 1. In section 5 the influence of
imperfect correlation and in particular the impact of the margin and buffer effects
is discussed. As before, the Cournot equilibrium is defined by the optimal choices of
yields the objective function: A + z − r − ´ A
y
F (y)dy − c(z), resulting in the first order condition:
1 − F (r − z) = c′(z). Total differentiation yields zRL(r) = F
′
(r−z)
F ′ (r−z)−c′′(z) < 0. Higher loan rates
imply less optimal effort, which translates into higher risk. Therefore, a riskier project (less costly
effort) yields a higher success return to the borrower, i.e. α(pi) is assumed to be positive, concave
and increasing in pi.
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individual loan quantities:
l∗i = argmax ([(1− p(r(L)))(r (L)− rD(1− β))− rKβ]) (9)
For the sake of notational simplification, the extended indirect demand function is
defined as: h(L, β) := (1 − p(r(L)))(r (L) − rD(1 − β)). Even with linear indirect
demand and indirect risk shifting, the extended indirect demand function is not any
more linear. However, with linear demand and risk shifting functions, h(L) has the
characteristics that guarantee a unique Cournot equilibrium, i.e.: h′(L) < 0 and
h′′(L) < 0.10 To make sure that the reaction functions intersect, I assume that
h(0) > β ·rK . In other words, it is assumed that investing in risky projects is socially
desirable. The first order condition, that defines a symmetric pure strategy Cournot
equilibrium is then defined by:
h′(L, β) · L
n
+ (h(L, β)− rKβ) = 0 (10)
As this paper is concerned with the stability of the banking sector in Bertrand and
two stage capacity constrained competition that yields Cournot results, the question
to be answered is how the probability of default of each bank is effected by changes in
the exogenous parameters. Define q as the probability of default of a single bank. For
the very simplified case of perfect correlation, the probability of default of a bank is
reflected by the probability of default of the borrowers q = p(r(L)). In particular, the
probability of bank default increases whenever the loan interest increases, implying
that a decrease in equilibrium loan supply increases the probability of a bank default.
Lemma 4. A decrease in aggregate equilibrium loan supply of perfectly correlated
10For the existence of a pure strategy Cournot equilibrium with the linear cost function, it is
sufficient that the extended demand function is concave h′(L) = −p′(L)(r (L)− rD(1− β)) + (1−
p(r(L)))r′ (L) < 0 because p′(r) > 0 and r′(L) < 0 and h′′(L) = p′(r(L))r′(L) < 0.
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risky loans increases the probability of default of the investing banks and thus desta-
bilizes the banking sector.
Proof. Using Lemma 3 and the assumption of decreasing loan demand it is straight-
forward that dq
dL
= p′(r(L))r′(L) < 0.
Consider first the direct effect of a change in the competition level due to an
exogenous change in the market concentration. As in the traditional Cournot equi-
librium, a change in the competition that is reflected by an exogenous change of the
number of competitors n has a positive effect on the supply of loans.
Lemma 5. Ceteris paribus, the aggregate loan supply L in equilibrium is lower in
more concentrated markets, i.e.,dL
dn
> 0.
Proof. Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (10) I show that
dL
dn
= − h(L, β)− β · rK
h′′(L)L+ (1 + n)h′(L)
> 0 (11)
The denominator is negative whenever the second order condition of the bank’s
objective function holds, i.e., it is clearly negative for a concave extended demand
function. The numerator is positive, as long as the assumption that h(0) > β · rK
holds.
This is the result of Boyd and De Nicolò (2005). Due to the risk shifting effect,
a reduction in competition that increases loan interest rates destabilizes the banking
sector.
However, this paper is not concerned with the direct effect of competition on the
stability of banks, but instead with the indirect effect that capital requirement has
on the price setting power and its impact on banking stability. In order to analyze
this impact, it is necessary to understand first the direct impact of an increase in
capital requirements on banking stability, and then compare the results for Bertrand
competition and two stage capacity loan interest rate competition. Applying the
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implicit function theorem to equation (10) I obtain:
dL
dβ
= −
∂2Π(L,β)
∂L∂β
∂2Π(L,β)
∂L2
= −
(
∂h(L,β)
∂β
− rK
)
+ ∂
2h(L,β)
∂β∂L
L
n
h′′(L)L+ (1 + n)h′(L)
(12)
The denominator is negative if the second order condition holds, which is in particular
true for linear demand and linear risk shifting functions. Therefore, the sign of the
right hand side of equation (12) is determined by the sign of the numerator. In
particular, if
(
∂h(L,β)
∂β
− rK
)
+ ∂
2h(L,β)
∂β∂L
L
n
< 0, an increase in capital requirements
results in lower aggregate supply of loans in equilibrium, and vice versa. For perfectly
correlated loan defaults, the partial derivative of the extended demand function is
simply:
∂h(L, β)
∂β
= (1− p(r(L)) · rD > 0 (13)
If equity funding is costly (rK ≥ rD) then it must clearly hold that (1−p(r(L)))·rD <
rK because p(r(L)) ∈ [0, 1] because it is a probability.11 Therefore, the first term
in brackets is negative and reflects the decreasing profitability of each unit of loan
when equity funding is more expensive than deposit funding.
Applying Young’s theorem to equation (13) one obtains:
∂2h(L, β)
∂L∂β
= −p′(r(L))) · r′(L) · rD > 0 (14)
The impact of an increase in capital requirement on each bank’s profit is thus
ambiguous:
11Even if the opportunity cost of equity funding would equal rD, the limited liability to depositors
already implies higher expected marginal cost of equity.
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∂2Π(L, β)
∂L∂β
=
(
∂h(L, β)
∂β
− rK
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
∂2h(L, β)
∂L∂β
· L
n︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(15)
Proposition 1. If the cost of recapitalization is sufficiently low, such that there is no
binding capacity constraint on Bertrand competition, an increase in capital require-
ments will unambiguously decrease the stability of banks under perfect correlation.
Proof. Recall from Lemma 2 that unconstrained Bertrand competition translates in
the quantity space into n → ∞ such that equation (15) becomes unambiguously
negative: an increase in β decreases the supply of loans in equilibrium. The decrease
in loan supply increases the equilibrium loan interest rate and through risk shifting
as the only effect this decreases the banks’ probability of default as shown in Lemma
4.
This result is similar to the argumentation of Boyd and De Nicolò (2005). With-
out any price setting power the only effect of the increase in capital requirements and
the resulting higher marginal funding costs is an increase in loan interest rates. The
higher loan interest rate then unambiguously translates into borrower risk shifting
and decreases the bank stability.
Moreover, it becomes clear that the sign of right hand side of equation (15)
depends critically on n.
Lemma 6. A higher market concentration, i.e., a lower n, increases the cross partial
derivative ∂
2Π(L,β)
∂L∂β
.
Proof. Using equations (13), (14) and (15) I obtain:
−
(
rK
rD
− (1− p(r(L)))
)
− p′(r(L)) · r′(L) · L
n
(16)
Differentiation with respect to n yields:
−p′(r(L))) · r′(L) ·
[
dL
dn
+
dL
dn
n
− L
n2
]
≷ 0 (17)
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Because −p′(r(L))) · r′(L) > 0, the sign of the derivative depends on the terms in
brackets. A lower n increases equation (15) whenever
[
dL
dn
+
dL
dn
n
− L
n2
]
< 0. Intu-
itively, this condition means that an increase in the number of competitors increases
the aggregate loan supply more than it reduces the individual loan supply as con-
jectured in Martinez-Miera (2009) based on simulations. Because n, the number of
competitors, is strictly positive, this condition can be reduced to:
dL
dn
<
L
n · (n+ 1) (18)
Recalling Lemma 5, i.e., using equation (11) I obtain:
− h(L, β)− β · rK
h′′(L)L+ (1 + n)h′(L)
<
L
n · (n+ 1) (19)
This can be simplified to:12
h(L, β)− β · rK < − h
′′(L)L2
n · (n+ 1) − h
′(L) · L
n
(20)
Moreover, the first order condition for the Cournot equilibrium that is given in
equation (10) can be rewritten as:13
(h(L, β)− β · rK) = −h′(L, β) · L
n
(21)
Substituting the right hand side in the left side of the inequality yields:
− h
′′(L)L2
n · (n+ 1) > 0 (22)
This condition holds for h′′(L) < 0 as provided in our model.14
12The second order condition requires that −(h′′(L)L+ (1 + n)h′(L)) > 0.
13Further modification would lead to the standard Cournot equilibrium condition -
(h(L,β)−β·rK)
(h(L,β) =
1
n
e - the Lerner Index in equilibrium equals the market share over the point price
elasticity at the equilibrium price.
14In the standard Cournot oligopoly model with linear indirect demand, this term is zero. Im-
plying that, with a linear extended demand function, the market concentration plays no role on
the impact of capital requirement regulation on the stability of banks because an increase in the
number of competitors increases the aggregate output exactly in the same amount as the individual
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Lemma 6 shows that there exists an n for which it is not optimal for the competing
banks to shift the cost of higher capital requirements to their borrowers. Anticipating
the risk shifting reaction to higher loan interest rates, a bank with high price setting
power prefers to keep the loan interest rate constant or even lowers it, when capital
requirements are increased. Denoting LM as the optimal monopoly output and
assuming that the risk shifting effect is high enough, i.e., −p′(r(LM))) · r′(LM)LM >(
rK
rD
− (1− p(r(LM)))
)
, the following proposition can be derived.
Proposition 2. If risk shifting is high, the impact of the capital requirement on
the equilibrium loan interest rate is not monotone but may depend on the number of
competitors:
if n > nˆ → ∂2Π(L,β)
∂L∂β
< 0 → dr
dβ
> 0
if n < nˆ → ∂2Π(L,β)
∂L∂β
> 0 → dr
dβ
< 0
Proof. If risk shifting is high, i.e.
(
−p′r′(LM) · LM > rK
rD
− (1− p(r(LM)))
)
, a mo-
nopolist finds it optimal to increase the loan interest rate, i.e., to reduce the loan
supply, when he faces higher marginal cost from capital requirement regulation
(dr(L)
dβ
< 0). If n → ∞, the cross partial derivative is unambiguously negative such
that the default probability increases with higher capital requirements dr(L)
dβ
> 0.
From Lemma 6, it becomes clear that there must exist a critical number of competi-
tors nˆ for which the cross partial derivative is zero.
If banks gain price setting power through higher capital requirements, the loan
interest rate is not monotonically increasing in capital requirements. If the Cournoti-
zation effect is high compared to risk shifting (due to high market concentration),
a capital requirement increase will increase aggregate lending. The intuition is that
banks consider the risk shifting effect when setting optimal capacities. If they gain
enough price setting power, they can internalize the increased marginal cost and
thereby avoid the risk shifting of their borrowers.
output is reduced.
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Proposition 3. A binding capacity constraint on Bertrand competition, resulting
from increased capital requirements, may stabilize the banking sector if the market is
highly concentrated.
Proof. Recall from Lemma 2 that unconstrained Bertrand competition translates in
n → ∞ such that equation (15) becomes unambiguously negative: an increase in β
decreases the supply of loans in equilibrium. The decrease in loan supply increases
the banks’ probability of default as shown in Lemma 4.
Note, however, that the increase in capital requirements decreases the leverage
of the potentially defaulting banks. Considering that a high proportion of the social
cost of a bank default is driven by the size of outstanding debt, and not only by
the fact of the default, a lower debt level may mean lower cost in case of default.
Therefore, an increase in capital requirements in this setting makes a bank default
ex ante more likely, but may decrease the ex post cost of the default.
5. Generalization to Imperfect Correlation
If not all loan investments default at the same time, the bank can survive a
certain aggregate share of loan defaults in the investment portfolio, due to the equity
it invested, which is the so called buffer effect (IV), and the profit it makes on non-
defaulting loans in the portfolio, which is called the margin effect (II) accordingly to
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) . As illustrated in Figure 1, an individual bank
goes bankrupt whenever the revenue from non-defaulting loans cannot compensate
the liabilities rD to its depositors D = (1 − β)L. Using the introduced variables,
this aggregate share of defaults that a bank can survive is implicitly defined by the
following equation:
(1− x) · r(L)L < rD ·D (23)
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Define xˆ(L) as the critical aggregate loan failure rate that makes the non-defaulting
condition binding:
xˆ(L) =
r(L)− (1− β)rD
r(L)
(24)
The bank’s probability of default is then the probability to observe an aggregate
portfolio default rate above this critical value.
The probability of observing such an aggregate default rate in the portfolio is
analyzed using a one-factor Gaussian copula model of time to default.15 The basic
assumption is that a bank invests in a highly granulated portfolio of assets with
individual probabilities of default p(r(L)). It is assumed that the copula correlation
between each pair of homogenous borrowers is ρ < 1. The single risk factor model
then assumes that the default of each individual loan investment is triggered by the
random project value falling below a critical value. The random project return of a
project can be described as:
Bj =
√
ρ · Z +
√
1− ρ · εj (25)
where Z is a common systematic risk factor that effects all projects and εj is an
idiosyncratic risk factor that is independent among the projects. Assume that both
random variables are independently standard normally distributed. The constant ρ,
hence, measures the correlation between project returns, i.e., defines the proportion
of systematic and idiosyncratic risk that triggers the project value. For each state
of nature, which reflects a certain realization of the systemic factor, I can define a
15The IRB approach in Basel II and III is based on this model that is also known as the Vasicek
model (Vasicek, 2002).
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conditional probability of default:
pj(z) = P [Bj < cj|Z = z] (26)
where cj reflects a certain threshold value, which the project return has to outweigh.
In this paper’s model framework this threshold value is the borrower’s liability to
the bank.
Because the project return is the sum of two independent standard normally
distributed variables the return itself is also Bj ∼ N(0, 1), such that pj(z) = φ(cj) or
cj = φ
−1(pj). The threshold value is the quantile for the default probability that the
borrowers choose when confronted with the standard debt contract. Conditional on
the realization of Z = z, there is only one random variable left, the idiosyncratic risk
that determines the conditional probability of default of a representative project:
qj(z) = P
[√
ρ · z +
√
1− ρ · εj ≤ φ−1(pj) |Z = z
]
(27)
Since εj ∼ N(0, 1), the conditional probability of default in a certain state of nature
is:
qj(z) = φ
(
φ−1(pj)−√ρ · z√
1− ρ
)
(28)
For the derivation of the cumulative distribution of the failure rate the assumption
that the states of nature are also standard normally distributed, z ∼ N(0, 1), is used:
F (x, p) = P
[
φ
(
φ−1(p)−√ρ·z√
1−ρ
)
≤ x
]
= P
[
−z ≤
√
1− ρ · φ−1(x)− φ−1(p)√
ρ
]
= φ
(√
1− ρ · φ−1(x)− φ−1(p)√
ρ
)
(29)
This gives the probability to observe an aggregate failure rate smaller or equal to
x ∈ [0, 1].
A certain bank’s stability can therefore be described as the probability of observ-
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ing an aggregate failure rate, which a bank is able to survive P [x < xˆ]:
F (xˆ(β, r(L)), p(r(L)) = φ
(√
1− ρ · φ−1(xˆ)− φ−1(p)√
ρ
)
(30)
The above equation illustrates that the correlation ρ among individual loan de-
faults determines the existence and strength of the the buffer and margin effects,
which are effects on the critical default rate xˆ. If the correlation is imperfect ρ < 1,
the bank’s stability depends on the individual loan default probabilities p(r(L)) and
the value of the aggregate failure rate the bank can survive xˆ(β, r(L)) weighted with
√
1− ρ. If correlation is perfect, i.e., ρ = 1, the weight becomes zero and bank
stability is defined solely by φ (φ−1(p)) = p the default probability of a single loan is
equal to the default probability of the bank as it was analyzed in the section above.
Bank stability with ρ < 1 directly depends on the capital requirement rate,
because with higher equity a bank can absorb higher losses. This is reflected in the
fact that the critical default rate is increasing in the capital requirement ∂xˆ
∂β
> 0.16
Moreover, the bank’s stability depends on the effect the capital requirement has on
the equilibrium loan interest rate. On the one hand, an increase in the loan interest
rate leads to higher profits per non-defaulting loan. This again increases the bank’s
stability because with higher profits, more defaults can be absorbed. On the other
hand, as discussed above, a higher loan interest rate results in the discussed risk
shifting effect: the limitedly liable borrowers choose higher individual risks, which
increases the bank’s probability of default.
Lemma 7. Under imperfect correlation, an increase of capital requirement affects
the stability of a bank in three ways. Which effect prevails is influenced by the strength
16For notational simplicity I neglect in the following the indirect functional relationships and
where suitable, I write e.g. only F (xˆ, p) when referring to F (xˆ(β, r(L)), p(r(L)).
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of the Cournotization effect.
dF (xˆ, p)
dβ
=
∂F (xˆ)
∂xˆ
· ∂xˆ
∂β︸ ︷︷ ︸
Buffer(+)
+
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝∂F (xˆ)∂xˆ · ∂xˆ∂r︸ ︷︷ ︸
Margin(+)
+
∂F (p)
∂p
· ∂p
∂r︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk Shifting(−)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ · drdβ︸︷︷︸ ≷ 0
Cournotization(±)
(31)
Proof. For the formal proof see Appendix B. Intuitively, Buffer effect (IV) is posi-
tive, because F (xˆ, p(r(L))) is a cumulative distribution function such that increasing
xˆ has a positive effect on bank stability ∂F (xˆ,p(r(L)))
∂xˆ
> 0 and ∂xˆ
∂β
= rD
r(L)
is positive
for strictly positive loan and deposit rates. Similarly, the Margin effect (III) is pos-
itive because higher loan interest rates increase the critical default threshold level
∂xˆ
∂r
= (1−β)(rD)
(r(L))2
> 0. The Risk Shifting effect (II) is negative due to the negative
first order stochastic dominance effect of an increased borrower default probability
∂F (xˆ,p(r(L)))
∂p
< 0 and the positive effect of an increased loan rate on the borrowers’
default probabilities.
Depending on the exogenous parameters, three possible scenarios exist that de-
termine the effect that the gained market power has on the impact of an increase in
regulation on stability.
Case 1: |Buffer |>|(Margin+Risk Shifting)· dr
dβ
|, the buffer effect outweighs the
risk shifting and margin effect. In this case, the gained price setting power of banks
does not influence the total effect that is fully driven by the buffer effect. An increase
in capital requirement regulation unambiguously increases the stability of banks re-
gardless of the competitive market structure. This situation reflects the traditional
view on capital regulation and is not analyzed any further.
Case 2: |Buffer |<|(Margin+Risk Shifting)· dr
dβ
| and |Margin|<|Risk Shifting |: the
buffer effect is low and the risk shifting outweighs the margin effect. This is a more
general case of the perfect correlation analysis above: Risk shifting is the dominant
effect and an increase in capital requirements translates into higher risk. If banks
have no price setting power, an increase in capital requirements unambiguously de-
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creases the banks’ stability. The Cournotization effect may enhance stability because
the gain of price setting power allows banks to internalize the increase in the marginal
cost of equity funding. In highly concentrated markets banks are thus reluctant to in-
crease the loan interest because they anticipate risk shifting of borrowers. Analogous
to the discussion of perfect correlation an increase in capital requirements then can
lead to lower loan interest rates if the risk shifting effect is high enough as discussed
above.
Case 3: |Buffer |<|(Margin+Risk Shifting)· dr
dβ
| and |Margin|>|Risk Shifting |:
The buffer effect is small and the margin effect outweighs the risk shifting effect.
In this case, a gain in price setting power that would lead to a decrease in the equi-
librium loan interest rate would destroy the stability enhancing effect of an increase
in equity funding. However, such a situation is not feasible in equilibrium because
whenever the margin effects outweighs the Risk Shifting effect, an increase in capital
requirements always increases the equilibrium loan rate, i.e., reduces the equilibrium
loan supply, regardless of the number of competitors.
The following argumentation shows that the Cournotization can only influence
the net effect of capital requirement regulation on stability in Case 2 but not in
Case 3.
From equation (12) it is clear that an increased capital requirement decreases the
equilibrium loan interest rate, whenever the equilibrium loan supply increases, i.e.,
whenever the cross partial derivative of the objective function with respect to L and
β is positive.
The necessary conditions for the cross partial derivative to be positive is a low
number of competitors n, as well as a positive cross-derivative of the extended de-
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mand function ∂
2h(L,β)
∂L∂β
> 0.17 However, in contrast to the perfect correlation analysis,
the cross partial derivative of the indirect extended demand function is not unam-
biguously positive. The indirect demand function of a limitedly liable bank may now
be written as:
h(L, β) :=
xˆˆ
0
((1− xˆ) · r(L)− rD · (1− β)) dF (x, p(r(L)) (32)
Partial integration yields:
h(L, β) :=
xˆˆ
0
F (x, p(r(L))) · r(L)dx. (33)
∂h(L, β)
∂β
= F (xˆ, p(r(L))) · r(L) · ∂xˆ
∂β
> 0 (34)
Substituting ∂xˆ
∂β
= rD
r(L)
this reduces to:
∂h(L, β)
∂β
= F (xˆ, p(r(L))) · rD > 0. (35)
Applying Young’s theorem, the cross partial is obtained:
∂2h(L, β)
∂L∂β
= rD
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝∂F (xˆ)∂xˆ · ∂xˆ∂r︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+
∂F (p)
∂p
· ∂p
∂r︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ · dr(L)dL (36)
The first term in brackets is the Margin effect and the second term is the Risk Shifting
effect, as defined above. With decreasing indirect demand for loans, i.e., dr(L)
dL
< 0,
17As before, the cross partial derivative of the objective function is: ∂
2Π(L,β)
∂L∂β =
(
∂h(L,β)
∂β − rK
)
+
∂2h(L,β)
∂L∂β · Ln . As under perfect correlation, the first term is negative, due to the limited liability of
the banks. However, the sign of the second term is not any more unambiguously positive.
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the equation (36) is positive if |Margin|<|Risk Shifting | and negative otherwise.
Proposition 4. If the Buffer effect is small and the Risk Shifting effect outweighs
the Margin effect (Case 2), an increased price setting power of banks may reestablish
the stabilizing impact of capital regulation.
Proof. If |Margin|<|Risk Shifting |, it follows from equation (36) that ∂
2h(L,β)
∂L∂β
> 0
and thus
∂2Π(L, β)
∂L∂β
=
(
∂h(L, β)
∂β
− rK
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
+
∂2h(L, β)
∂L∂β
· L
n︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
. (37)
As this is equal to equation (15), the Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 from the special
case of perfect correlation also hold as long as the assumptions of Case 2 hold.
However, for Case 3, where it is assumed that the Margin effect outweighs the
Risk Shifting effect, equation (36) becomes negative. With a negative cross partial
derivative of the indirect extended demand function, the cross partial derivative of
the objective function is also negative, regardless of the number of competitors.
Proposition 5. If the Buffer effect is small and the Margin effect outweighs the Risk
Shifting effect (Case 3) an increased capital requirement unambiguously increases
the stability of the banking sector regardless of the market structure.
Proof. If |Margin|>|Risk Shifting |, the right hand side of (36) is unambiguously
negative, such that
∂2Π(L, β)
∂L∂β
=
(
∂h(L, β)
∂β
− rK
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
+
∂2h(L, β)
∂L∂β
· L
n︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
< 0. (38)
Therefore:
dL
dβ
= −
∂2Π(L,β)
∂L∂β
∂2Π(L,β)
∂L2
< 0 (39)
Increased capital requirements result in a reduced equilibrium loan supply such that
dr
dβ
> 0 regardless of the number of competitors. Using Lemma 7 it is straightforward
that dF (xˆ,p)
dβ
> 0 ∀n ∈ Z+
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Table 2: Overview of the Results
The + and − signs indicate the direction of the effect, the frequency indicates
the relative strength of each effect.
If stricter equity regulation allows competing banks to strategically commit on
loan capacities, the gained price setting power has only limited implications on the
stability of the banking sector. In Case 1 and Case 3, a stricter regulation fosters
stability regardless of the competitive mode in the banking sector. However, in Case
2 where stricter regulation harms the stability under perfect competition, the anti-
competitive effect of stricter regulation can outweigh the risk shifting and reestablish
banking stability. Because of the gained price setting power from stricter regulation,
the banks consider the risk shifting effect in their optimal choices if the market
concentration is low. The results are summarized in Table 2.
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6. Conclusion
Higher capital requirements may increase the price setting power of banks that
compete for risky borrowers. If increased capital requirements stabilize the banking
sector under perfect competition this increased price setting power does not have
any impact on stability. However, if under perfect competition higher capital re-
quirements result in a significant increase in the default probabilities of borrowers,
i.e., Risk Shifting is high, the increased price setting power can revers this destabi-
lizing effect. Intuitively, the Cournotization of the market enhances the ability of
banks to internalize the increased costs of equity funding. With many competitors,
the price setting power increase is not enough to offset the higher marginal cost of
capital funding. The impact of the capital requirement with Cournotization is the
same as under Bertrand competition. However, if the increase in price setting power
is high enough, the banks internalize the increased marginal cost and the net effect
of higher capital requirements becomes stability enhancing.
The analysis implies that an increase in capital requirement regulation should be
accompanied by policies that regulate competition and the recapitalizations of banks
if correlation among loans is high and the borrowers’ risk taking is very sensitive
to loan interest changes. The optimal policy mix depends on the structure of the
banking sector and the risk characteristics of the borrowers that banks invest in. If
and only if the risk shifting of borrowers is high, such that Case 2 is likely to describe
the real economy, an increase in capital requirements should be accompanied by a
restriction of competition and by no means with a support of recapitalization. With
the gained price setting power, the banks can consider the price sensitivity of their
borrowers. Therefore, the banks will be reluctant to burden their customers with
the cost of higher capital requirements but will absorb the higher marginal cost
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with their profits from increased price setting power. If reality can be described
by Case 1 or Case 3, the market structure has no impact on the effectiveness of
capital requirement regulation. In this case, the traditional view that a regulator has
to trade off stability and bank market efficiency does not hold. In this case, equity
regulation and efficiency are separable goals such that a regulator can increase capital
requirements and foster competition among banks at the same time.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 3
For any given loan rate, the entrepreneur maximizes his payoff:
max
pj
u(r) = (1− pj)(α(pj)− r)
s.t. u(r) ≥ ui
(A.1)
The first order condition is characterized with:
(1− pj) · α′(pj)− α(pj) + r = 0 (A.2)
Which implicitly defines a unique default choice p∗j(r). The assumption α(0) >
α′(0) secure a unique interior solution for any loan interest rate in the interval
α(0) − α′(0) < r < α(1). Using the envelop theorem, it can be shown that ∂u(r)
∂r
=
−(1 − p∗(r)) < 0. For any optimal effort choice, an increase in the loan rate de-
creases borrowers utility. Let L(r) denote the total loan demand, which exactly
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equals L(r) = G(u(r)). For any given loan rate r, a measure of G(u(r)) obtains an
alternative utility less or equal to u(r) and, therefore, demands a loan. Since G′ > 0,
it is straightforward that the total demand for loans is decreasing in the loan interest
rate. Total differentiation of the first order condition gives
dp
dr
= − 1
(1− p) · α′′(p)− 2α′(p) > 0 (A.3)
An increase in loan interest rates increases the probability of default of the loan.
Appendix B. The Effects of Capital Requirement on the Stability of the
Banking Sector
The probability that a bank does not fail as a measure for the banking sector
stability is:
F (xˆ(β, r(L)), p(r(L)) = φ
(√
1− ρ · φ−1(x)− φ−1(p)√
ρ
)
(B.1)
The direct effect of capital on the bank’s probability of failure is the capital buffer
effect, i.e., higher equity funding increases the failure threshold:
∂F (xˆ)
∂xˆ
· ∂xˆ
∂β︸ ︷︷ ︸
Buffer
=
(√
1− ρ√
ρ
)
φ
(
φ−1(p)−√1− ρ · φ−1(xˆ)√
ρ
)(
dφ−1(xˆ)
dxˆ
)
rD
r(L)
0 (B.2)
The indirect effect of capital requirements: through higher cost and the Cournotiza-
tion effect, less loans are supplied, but at a higher loan interest rate. This leads to
the risk shifting effect. When banks charge higher loan interest rates, the borrowers
react with investing in riskier loans.
∂F (p)
∂p
· ∂p
∂r︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk Shifting
=
(
− 1√
ρ
)
φ
(
φ−1(p)−√1− ρ · φ−1(xˆ)√
ρ
)(
dφ−1(p)
dp
)
< 0 (B.3)
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When all projects do not default at the same time, higher loan rates also imply higher
margins of non-defaulting loans which enhances bank stability.
∂F (xˆ)
∂xˆ
· ∂xˆ
∂r︸ ︷︷ ︸
Margin
=
(√
1− ρ√
ρ
)
φ
(
φ−1(p)−√1− ρ · φ−1(xˆ)√
ρ
)(
dφ−1(xˆ)
dxˆ
)
(1− β)rD
r(L)2
> 0
(B.4)
The total impact can be summarized as:
dF (xˆ,p)
dβ
=
(√
1− ρ√
ρ
)
φ
(
φ−1(p)−√1− ρ · φ−1(xˆ)√
ρ
)(
dφ−1(xˆ)
dxˆ
)
rD
r(L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Buffer (+)
−
(
1√
ρ
)
φ
(
φ−1(p)−√1− ρ · φ−1(xˆ)√
ρ
)(
dφ−1(p)
dp
)
· p′(r)︸ ︷︷ ︸ ·
Risk Shifting(−)
dr
dβ
+
(√
1− ρ√
ρ
)
φ
(
φ−1(p)−√1− ρ · φ−1(xˆ)√
ρ
)(
dφ−1(xˆ)
dxˆ
)
(1− β)(rD)
(r(L))2︸ ︷︷ ︸ ·
Margin(+)
dr
dβ
(B.5)
It is easy to see that the correlation between bank failures determines which effect
prevails. For imperfect correlation, the result is generally ambiguous and depends
on which effect prevails. The more the individual project failures are correlated (the
higher the systematic risk), the more likely it is that the bank destabilizing risk
shifting effect outweighs the stabilizing margin effect and the buffer effect. With
perfect correlation, the margin effect and the buffer effect disappear, and the only
effect of an increased loan interest rate is the borrower risk shifting.
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